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INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, there exists a disparity in the rights
and privileges of the American work force. Unionized workers
enjoy tremendous job security, work benefits, and an array of
statutory protections. Others, less fortunate, are worked and discharged at the whim of the employer. This latter group of employees, working under what is termed an "at-will" relationship,
constitute a majority of the United States work force. Indeed,
eighty-five percent of the present American work force-approximately eighty-three million people-are employed under the at-will
doctrine.1 These non-unionized workers are discharged at a rate
two times that of unionized employees. 2 In all, some 1.4 million of
3
these workers are terminated from their jobs each year.
t A.B. 1988, Duke University;J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Pennsylvania. This
Comment is dedicated to my parents. Special thanks go to Professor Clyde W.
Summers and Naomi H. Milton.
1 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNiTED STATES: 1990, at 418 (table 687, union membership); id. at 378 (table 624,

total workforce). These numbers reflect private sector employment and do not include
government workers or military personnel. See id. at 395 (table 651, government
employees); see also Baker, NLRA Section 8(a)(3) andthe SearchforA NationalLaborPolicy,
7 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 71, 104 n.121 (1989) (noting that 12.9 percent of "all private
nonagricultural wage and salary workers were members of unions ...while 14.2 percent
[of those same workers] were represented by unions").
2 See Hames, The CurrentStatus of the Doctrine of Employment-At-Wil 39 LAB. LJ. 19,
19 (1988).
3 See Maltby, The Decline of Employment At Will-A QuantitativeAnalysis, 41 LAB. LJ.
51, 53 (1990). As many as one million employees are discharged by private industry
annually without a fair hearing. See Abbassi, Hollman & Murrey, Employment at Will:
An Eroding Concept in Employment Relationships, 38 LAB. LJ.21, 21 (1987). Estimates
suggest that as many as 200,000 of these at-will employees are wrongfully discharged
each year. See id.
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This disparity in employment environments obviously has a
significant effect upon the at-will employee both psychologically and
financially. Unfortunately, such a situation wreaks havoc not only
upon the lives of these individual workers. Besides being an archaic
and inequitable theorem of law, the at-will doctrine creates an
adverse impact upon the employer and the economy at large.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of the at-will
doctrine as well as the traditional rationales which support its
existence.
Part II begins by analyzing some recent tort and
contractual erosions of the doctrine and then focuses upon a
particular exception to at-will employment-the employment
handbook as an implied contract. Part III traces the traditional
analysis of employment handbooks. Finally, Part IV advocates
adherence to the terms of the original handbook-as-contract in
situations where employers distribute subsequent handbooks
inconsistent with the rights and promises granted in the original.
I. THE AT-WILL PAST
With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, major changes in
the American work place were to alter forever the simple relations
between "master" and "servant" and the laws which regulated them.
Prior to the era of large-scale industry, mass employment, and
capital accumulation, employment relations were of little importance in the common law.4 With burgeoning nineteenth century
industry and its ever-increasing demand for labor, however, the
need for flexible employment arrangements and unhampered
managerial prerogative soon had an impact upon the development
of the common law. 5 Gone were the traditional duties under
master-servant law, where the employer took responsibility for the
servant's health and well-being. 6 Gone, too, was the presumption
that any employment was for a yearly term. 7 In the place of these
more traditional rules came the impersonal, arms-length theories of
"assumption of risk" and "freedom of contract." 8 It was this latter

4 See H. PERRT, EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAw AND PRACrICE 2 (1984).

5 See id. at 3.
6 See Note, Employment At-Will--The Implied Contract Limitation in Arizona-Leikvold
v. Valley View Community Hospital, 141 Ariz. 544, 688P.2d 170 (1984), 16 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
783, 786 (1985).
7 See id.
8 See H. PERRITr, supra note 4, at 4; Note, supra note 6, at 786; Note, ProtectingAt
Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARv. L. RaV. 1816, 1825-26 (1980).
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theory that would have a particularly significant influence on the
legal system and the system's treatment of employment.
The principle of freedom of contract augmented the abilities of
both employers and employees to determine independently their
economic relationship. Nothing was to be assumed about the
employment relationship. Absolute freedom of contract meant that
there could be no presumptions about duration of employment,
wages, or working conditions.9 For example, if an employee failed
to secure an express provision concerning duration or some other
aspect of her working situation, she was left without legal recourse.1 0
This preference for freedom of contract over any
presumption of employment terms found its most popular enunciation in a legal treatise by H.G. Wood in 1877.11 In A Treatise on
the Law of Master and Servant, Professor Wood announced what he
perceived to be the "American Rule":
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
primafacie a hiring at will, and if a servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring, at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that
it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time
the party may serve.... [1]t is an indefinite hiring and is determi12
nable at the will of either party ....
Though modern historians have noted that Wood's analysis
3
articulated a distinct departure from earlier American case law'
and that the four cases Wood cited as authority embraced no such
proposition, 14 the American judiciary soon seized upon the
"American Rule" 15 as a cornerstone of employment law. 16 Any
employment not for a definite term was presumed to be "at-will,"
meaning that the relationship could be terminated at the will of

9See H.

PERRrir, supra note 4, at 5.

10 See Note, supra note 8, at 1819 & nn.16-17.

11

H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).

12

Id.at 272.
13 See Committee Reports: At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissa=4 36
RECORD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK

170, 172 (1981);

Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481, 485 (1976).
14 See H. PERRIT, supra note 4, at 6.
Is This Comment uses the term "American Rule" interchangeably with the concept
of at-will employment.
16 See sources cited supra note 13.
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either party. 17 Reduced to its barest essentials, the at-will doctrine
permitted employees to quit their jobs at any time,1 8 and allowed
employers to discharge their employees at any time-for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.19
While the at-will doctrine may have nurtured nascent American
industry, its appearance and continued presence has not proved as
beneficent for the American worker. While the doctrine's neutral
wording implies that an employer and employee should be able to
bargain to some sort of mutually satisfactory arrangement, the
doctrine ignores the practical realities that few workers are skilled
and mobile enough simply to quit their employment if
dissatisfied. 20 Fewer workers still are in a position to exact significant contractual concessions on an individual basis. 2' The result
of such employee impotence is employee vulnerability. The at-will
doctrine has permitted firings in situations where employees have
merely filed workmen's compensation and unemployment claims,
reported illegal activities committed by the employer, reported for
jury duty, refused the sexual advances of the employer, refused to
support the political candidates advocated by the employer, or
refused to take psychological tests. 22 The doctrine allows employers to fire employees for visiting stores the employer declares offlimits, 23 and allows employers to fire thirty-year employees days
before their pensions vest. 24 Such egregious decisions are the
17
18

See Note, supra note 6, at 786.
See DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule On Employee Rights toJob

Security and FringeBenefits, 10 FORD-AM URB. L.J. 1, 8 & n.24 (1981). As one court
stated, "An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby
cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed, in this land of
opportunity it would be against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that any
man should thus handicap himself .... " Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc.,
174 La. 66, 67, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932).
19 See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overnled
on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 29-33. Especially in an age of increasing
specialization and bias against older workers, as well as unemployment, worker mobility
and hence ability to terminate employment is significantly reduced. For a discussion
on the impotence and insecurity of the modern day non-unionized employee vis-a-vis
the at-will doctrine, see generally Blades, Employment At- Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On
Limiting The Abusive Exercise of Employer Power,67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (arguing
that since the great majority of employees are viewed as fungible, most non-unionized
employees are not able to extract individually negotiated contracts from their
employers).
21 See Blades, supra note 20, at 1411.
22 See DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 9-10.
23 See Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20.
24 See Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 307, 448 N.E.2d
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result of a widespread judicial dogmatism in the employment law
context. The at-will rule has become, in many instances, an
irrebuttable rule of law that indeed countenances a firing for any
reason.

25

II.

DISSATISFACTION WITH THE AT-WILL RULE

The at-will doctrine (or American Rule) was a by-product of the
booming economic times in which it was born. The American Rule
increased an employer's freedom in the employment relationship

while it concomitantly limited her responsibilities and duties. 26 By
enabling the employer to adapt her work force to any circumstance
by terminating any undesirable or unproductive employee, the atwill doctrine contributed
to the entrepreneurship and economic
27
growth of an era.
Yet, in the past quarter century, a rising tide of criticism has
swelled against the at-will doctrine and its harsh effects upon the
employee. 28 The imbalance in the relationship between employer
and employee, a factor that led to the increase in labor unionism
over fifty years ago, 29 has sparked sharp criticism throughout the
legal community. Scholars have noted that in the modern era,
employees' comparative immobility is exacerbated by the narrowing
of alternative job opportunities resulting from technological
advances which require increased job specialization. Employees'
jobs have thus become increasingly precious. 30 The importance of
retaining one's job effectively eliminates many employees' ability to
leave their jobs. Consequently, employees' emphasis on job
retention, coupled with the employer's absolute power to fire
anyone for any reason, has been viewed as a recipe for significant
abuse. Apart from the sheer injustice of allowing employers to
discharge employees for insignificant or non-existent reasons, the
at-will doctrine has been faulted for creating a climate conducive to
86, 93, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 239 (1983) (Meyer, J., dissenting in part).
2 See Blades, supra note 20, at 1416; see also Note, The Employment Handbook as a
ContractualLimitation On The Employment At Will Doctrine, 31 ViLL. L. REv. 335, 339

(1986).

26 See Note, supra note 8, at 1826.

27 See DeGiuseppe, supranote 18, at 7; Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-AtWill Contracts,1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 198; Note, supra note 8, at 1826.
28 See Note, supra note 27, at 198. See generally Blades, supra note 20.

' See Blades, supra note 20, at 1404-05.

30 See id. at 1405.
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employer coercion. 3 1 The doctrine arguably fosters an employment relationship in which an employee's fear of discharge easily
renders her vulnerable to any overreaching demands made by the
employer. 32 This concern--that employees will be intimidated into
illegal or unsafe activity-has unfortunately proven to be more than
speculative. 3
The at-will doctrine also has been criticized for a larger ill effect
upon the economy as a whole.
Both commentators 34 and
35
courts recognized belatedly that the American Rule may in fact
have a negative impact on industrial efficiency. Becausejob security
can improve economic performance by increasing worker loyalty,
productivity, and inventiveness while reducing turn-over and
training costs, absenteeism, and sabotage, the at-will doctrine's
raison d'6tre itself is impeached. 6
In recent decades, the widespread dissatisfaction in the legal
community with the at-will doctrine has resulted in the development
of various theories and approaches which, to one degree or another,
cut serious inroads into what was once an "absolute presumption"
in favor of at-will employment. 37 Perhaps the most drastic approach has been the call for a complete rejection of the doctrine.
In its stead opponents argue for a "just cause" statute that would
cover every worker and would function like the grievance process
that has proved so successful in the unionized labor arbitration
arena. 38 While such a call has not gone entirely unheeded,3 9 it
See id. at 1406-07.

31

id. at 1407-08 & n.l1 (discussing dismissal as the organizational equivalent of
"economic capital punishment").
33 See e.g., id. at 1408 nn.17 -18, 1409 n.22 (describing employees who were forced
by their employers to carry on illegal activities and noting specific instances in which
employees were threatened with dismissal if they did not carry out an illegal or unsafe
activity).
34 See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 1830-36 (suggesting abandonment of the at-will
rule because it is economically inefficient).
35 Courts have also recognized that an unqualified application of the at-will doctrine
would negatively effect the economic system. See Fulford v. Burndy Corp., 623 F. Supp.
78, 80 (D.N.H. 1985); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549,
551 (1974).
36 See Bahrami, Productivity Improvement Through Cooperation of Employees and
Employers, 39 LAB. LJ. 168, 171-72 (1988); Note, supra note 8, at 1835; Note, Challenging
The Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
449, 453-55 (1983).
37 See Note, supra note 25, at 338-39.
38 See Summers, supra note 13, at 519-31 (arguing that a statute should be enacted
which articulates the right of employees not to be disciplined except for"just cause" and
channels the adjudication of cases arising under the statute into arbitration); see also
32 See
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is apparently too novel for many present day legislatures. 40 Today,
more scholarship and judicial acceptance has focused on emerging
contractual and tort claims favoring the employee. This series of
innovative claims, singly and in sum, represent a major carving out
of exceptions to, and exemptions from, the at-will doctrine.
In tort, the theory most widely used to mitigate the harsh effects
of the at-will doctrine is the public policy exception. Where a
discharge by an employer is found to be injurious to a clearly
articulated public good or policy, courts have often recognized a
41
tort of wrongful discharge based on public policy grounds.
Other tort theories that have provided a measure of relief from the
at-will discharge are the prima facie tort4 2 and the tort of inten43
tional infliction of emotional distress.
Contract theories have also been utilized by the aggrieved
employee to mitigate the American Rule. Courts are often willing
to remove a case from the ambit of the at-will doctrine when an
employee can show, apart from his usual services, valid additional
consideration in return for an employer's promise of benefits orjust
Perritt, Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REv. 65, 98 (1987) (suggesting that
an enumerated prohibitions approach to wrongful dismissal legislation is politically
more feasible than a simple just cause approach).
39 See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-902 to -914 (1987) (Montana's Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act).
40 See Note, supra note 25, at 343 n.37. (describing the Pennsylvania state
legislature's consideration and rejection of a bill to provide all employees with a
grievance process when dismissed without just cause).
41 See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that plaintiff-employee stated a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge
in alleging that employer fired her for threatening to report company's unlawful
activities to the Food and Drug Administration); see also DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at
30-34 (noting that an aggrieved employee carries the burden of proof that her employer
violated the public policy of a particular state in effectuating her discharge); Note,
Ravelo v. County of Hawaii: Promissory Estoppel and the Employment At-Will Doctrine 8
U. HAW. L. REV. 163, 169 (1986) (noting that courts generally recognize the tort of
wrongful discharge when termination by the employer is found to have violated public
policy).
42 See DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 42-43. The prima fade tort is defined as an
"infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damage, without excuse orjustification, by
an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful." Ruzza v. Ruzza, 286 A.D. 767,
769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1955), quoted with approvalin ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn,
Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1977).
43 See; e.g., Pratt v. Brown Machine Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1238-39 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that in order to make out a prima fade case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, plaintiff must establish: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2)
intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress); see also
DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 40-42.
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cause dismissal. 44 Without such additional consideration, however, such promises are mere gratuities, non-binding because of their
lack of consideration. The traditional notion of promissory estoppel
has also been used to protect an employee's reliance interest. By
showing a court that the employee reasonably relied to her
detriment on the employer's gratuitous promise, 45 the employee
can seek recovery "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
46
of the promise."
The employment handbook (also called an employer handbook
or personnel policy manuad), distributed by the employer and often
laced with explicit and implicit promises, constitutes yet another
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. This implied contract
exception, and its ramifications, will comprise the crux of this
47
Comment.
Yet, before turning to the employee handbook in depth, it
should be emphasized that the above exceptions to the at-will
doctrine are quite recent developments, resulting from a discerning
judiciary which has begun to cast a critical eye upon the American
Rule. 48 Commentators not so long ago were saturnine about the
assailability of the at-will doctrine,4 9 but the emerging erosion of
the doctrine-largely a reflection of courts' concern with the

44 See Note, supra note 41, at 169-70; see also Ohnian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 779
F.2d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that plaintiff's relocation from San Francisco to
New York was sufficient consideration for a promise of lifetime employment); Bravman
v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that a furniture
seller who forgoes representation of other manufacturers renders sufficient consideration to support ajury's conclusion that his contract with the defendant manufacturer
was not terminable at will); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prod., 188 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa
1971) (stating that selling a competitive business to the. employer was additional
consideration for a lifetime employment contract); cf. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 464-65, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982) (stating that a
detriment to a promisor need not benefit the promisee to serve as consideration).
45 Such a promise could be for full employment or of a just-cause termination
nature. It could also include more specific promises covering seniority and lay-off
assurances.
46 For the full text of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS definition of
promissory estoppel, see infra text accompanying note 116. Courts are increasingly
willing to apply promissory estoppel doctrine. See Comment, Employment At-Will and
the Law of Contracts, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 232 (1974). Courts seem particularly
willing to apply the doctrine where parties have an ongoing relationship, and
trustworthiness and reliability are necessary in such dealings. The employment
relationship is one example. See Farber & Matheson, Beyond PromissoyEstoppel: Contract
Law and the Invisible Handshake, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 925-26 (1985).
47 See infra notes 56-124 and accompanying text.
48 See DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 23; Note, supra note 41, at 168.
49 See Blades, supra note 20, at 1421; DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 3, 9-10.
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doctrine's harsh effects-suggests that the judicial community is now
willing to reevaluate the employment relationship. 50 While some
courts continue to cling dogmatically to the broad-brush simplicity
of the at-will rule, other more "progressive" 5 1 courts have recognized that the doctrine should not be viewed as stark and absolute.
These progressive courts properly interpret the at-will rule as a rule
of construction that merely aids courts in construing the relationship between employer and employee. 52 As commentators 53 and
courts 54 alike have noted, the at-will rule was created and endorsed by the bench; it can just as appropriately be modified by the
bench:
The employment-at-will rule is not set indelibly in stone. It is a
part of the common law judicially created, and within the power of
judicial reform. Thus, there is no reason to treat it as though it
has the strength of legislation .... "Inherent in the common law
is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself
to meet changing needs.... If this were not so, we must succumb
to a rule [stare decisis] that a judge should let others 'long dead
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives, do his
thinking for him' ..... s5
50 See Note, supra note 8, at 1824; Note, supra note 41, at 168-72.
51 1 use the traditional-progressive delineation recognized by other commentators.
See, e.g., Note, supranote 27, at 196. "Traditional" is meant to imply a more doctrinaire,
conservative approach to the at-will rule while a "progressive" appellation suggests a
philosophical willingness to re-examine the rule in modern contexts against developing
theories of law. Judges themselves often view exceptions to the at-will rule as
"progressive." See, e.g., Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481,486, 357 S.E.2d 452,
455 (1987) ("South Carolina, as a progressive state which wishes to see that both
employer and employee are treated fairly, now joins those states [recognizing the
handbook as an alteration to employment-at-will].").
employment
52
See, e.g., Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Va.
1987) (noting that "[u]nder Virginia law, a general hiring where the term of employment is not specified is presumed to be terminable at-will," though this presumption
may be rebutted); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 596-97, 292
N.W.2d 880, 884 (1980) (noting that the general rule that a contract for indefinite
employment is terminable at will is not "a substantive limitation on the enforceability
of employment contracts but merely a rule of 'construction'"); Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983) (explaining that the at-will rule is only
a rule of contract construction, imposing substantive limits to the formation of a
contract, but not preventing parties from providing for job security provisions in an
employment contract of an indefinite duration).
53 See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 1838 (asserting that "[c]ourts themselves created
the at will rule; it is therefore entirely appropriate that they now take the lead in
modifying it").
54 See Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 816 (Ala. 1984).
55 Id. (quoting Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567,568,596 P.2d 705,706 (1979), ovenuled,
Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 508, 667 P.2d 200, 208 (1983)).
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With this framework of change and fresh perspective, we turn to the
employee handbook exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
III. EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS: THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
For decades, employers have promulgated company policies and
rules through the medium of employee handbooks. 56
Such
manuals usually detail two types of formal rules: some are substantive, governing the employee's job and employment expectations,
while others are procedural, describing the granting of employee
benefits. 5 7 Handbooks may contain only vague policy statements,
or they may contain explicitly defined provisions concerning
termination procedures, severance pay, wages, or vacation and
pension plans. 58 Depending upon the employer, handbooks are
frequently used and adhered to during the course of employment,
although some employers disseminate handbooks and subsequently
pay little attention to them. 59 Most employers who use handbooks
issue such manuals to employees at the time of hiring, 60 but first
edition employment handbooks are not uncommonly distributed to
a work force that has been. employed for years. 61 Some employers
62
require each employee to read and sign her manual.
In the past and in some jurisdictions today, where the at-will
doctrine remains an insuperable substantive rule of law, 63 an
employers' oral or written promises are never binding unless the
employee supplies additional consideration beyond her usual services. 64 Under principles of consideration and mutuality that were
dominant in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries,
traditional contract notions prevented any other conclusion:
65
If
employees received wages in exchange for labor and services.
56 See H. PERRrIT, supra note 4, at 303-06.
57 See id. at 309.
58 See Comment, The Vestiges of the Texas At-Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive
Law: The Employment Handbook Ecrception, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 327, 334-35 (1986).
59 See id. at 335.
60 See id. at 334.
61 See, e.g., Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Minn. App.
1986) (noting that employee worked for fifteen years before handbook was written and
distributed); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481,483, 357 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1987)
(noting that plaintiff was employed for five years before company distributed a
personnel manual).
62 See Comment, supra note 58, at 335-36.
63 See id.
64 See Note, supra note 27, at 200-01.
65 See Note, supra note 25, at 351.
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an employee wished to make any aspect of her employment relationship binding, she was required to furnish the employer with
additional consideration. 66 Thus, for example, if an employee
wanted to make a promise of "just cause" discharge enunciated in
a handbook binding, under traditional contract analysis she would
have to supply her employer with some benefit beyond her ordinary
work product. This is because her work is already being compensated by her wages.
Under this traditional approach to the at-will doctrine, both
employer and employee receive a benefit from the employment
relationship, but neither is bound by it. The dissemination of an
employment handbook with just cause provisions should in no way
change the relationship. To require that a handbook be binding
without additional consideration would, under traditional analysis,
mean that an employer would be obligated to follow stated dismissal
procedures that she announced without any benefit in return. The
procedures would be binding on the employer, while the employee
would continue to enjoy the freedom of quitting at any time.
Therefore, courts applying traditional notions of contract and the
employment-at-will doctrine have continued to maintain that if an
employment manual is to be interpreted as a contract, additional
67
consideration from the employee is necessary.
The above discussion implicates another traditional impediment
to the handbook as contract: the doctrine of mutuality. Courts that
utilize the traditional analysis further support their theory of
consideration by stressing the unilateral nature of the employment
manual. The employment handbook, these courts contend, is
nothing more than a unilateral expression of company policy. Aside
from the fact that the handbook represents an unbargained-for
gratuitous statement by the employer with no employee consideration to make it binding, all formulation and codification of the
policies within are controlled by the employer. Since the employer
drafts and issues the handbook without employee input or ratification (i.e., no meeting of the minds), it is difficult to insist that such
handbooks embody any mutual obligation on the part of the
employee. 68 "[W]here an employee may leave his job at any time,
any agreement imposing a duty on the employer as to the employee's term[s] of employment lacks mutuality of obligation, and
6 See id.
67 See Comment, supra note 58, at 343-44; Note, supra note 25, at 350-52.
68 See Comment, supra note 58, at 344-45.
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hence, the employment is [still] for an indefinite period and is
terminable at will." 69 In sum, the doctrine of mutuality rejects
binding an employer to the promises of an employment manual
because the employee remains free to quit her employment at any
70
moment for any reason.
Although the doctrines of consideration and mutuality prove
fatal to any interpretation of handbook manuals as implied contracts
under a traditional analysis, such a dogmatic approach is becoming
increasingly rare in the United States. 7 1 More progressive courts,
in response to the harsh effects of the at-will doctrine, are insisting
on a re-appraisal of the doctrine. 72 In these courts, employmentat-will is no longer a substantive rule. Instead, it is understood as
73
a mere rule of construction which is subject to amendment.
IV. AMENDING THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Even though as recently as 1981 labor commentators could
credibly assert that most American courts would not regard
employment manuals as implied contracts, 74 the tide in this area
of law has since radically shifted. 75 At least thirty-three states and
the District of Columbia now recognize that specific promises

embodied in personnel handbooks may be binding upon employers. 76 These courts have arrived at their holdings via two avenues.
69 Note, supra note 25, at 352.
70 See Note, supra note 27, at 202.
71 See Comment, supra note 58, at 336.
72 See Note, supra note 27, at 209; Comment, supra note 58, at 342.
73 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 27, at 21112 (asserting that progressive courts view the doctrine of employment-at-will "as a rule
of construction, rather than one of substance"); Comment, supra note 58, at 340-43
(citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980),
where the court rejected the view that employment-at-will constituted a substantive rule
of law rather than a rule of construction); Note, supra note 25, at 340 (claiming that the
number of courts willing strictly to apply the employment-at-will doctrine has greatly
declined in favor of a rebuttable presumption of employment-at-will).
74 See DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 44-45.
75
See, e.g., Note, supra note 27, at 199-200 (describing the courts' recent approach
to employment manuals as "part of the general erosion of the employment-at-will
doctrine"); Comment, LaborLaw-Employment At Will Doctrine, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 72728 (1986) (noting that the majority of courts to address the issue in recent years have
recognized that employment manuals may have binding effect).
76 See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Jones v.
Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989); Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (en banc); Gladden v. Arkansas
Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.,
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Some courts have undertaken a re-evaluation of consideration and
mutuality and their effect on at-will employment, while other courts
have relied upon the notion of promissory estoppel to make such
handbooks binding. 77 Both approaches are examined in turn.
A. UnilateralContract
A major feature of the progressive courts is a willingness to
examine the at-will doctrine afresh. While this re-examination is
part of a larger repudiation of nineteenth century concepts in labor
law, 78 it is also a direct result of the unfair outcomes produced by
mechanical applications of the American Rule. 79 Progressive

759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 202 Conn.
190, 520 A.2d 208 (1987); Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613 (D.C.
App. 1985); Shannon v. Huntley'sJifty Stores, 174 Ga. App. 125,329 S.E.2d 208 (1985);
Nilsson v. Mapco, 115 Idaho 18,764 P.2d 95 (1988); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth
Hosp. Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482,505 N.E.2d 314 (1987); Cannon v. National By-Prod., 422
N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1988); Libby v. Calais Regional Hosp., 554 A.2d 1181 (Me. 1989);
Staggs v. Blue Cross, 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Enyeart v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 238 Mont. 21,776 P.2d 488 (1989); Morris
v. Lutheran Med. Center, 215 Neb. 677,340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Southwest Gas Corp.
v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99
N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 575 (1985); Forrester v. Parker,
93 N.M. 781,606 P.2d 191 (1980); Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345
N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984); Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 46 Ohio St. 3d 134,545 N.E.2d
1244 (1989); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Swartout v.
Precision Castparts Corp., 83 Or. App. 203, 730 P.2d 1270 (1986); Small v. Springs
Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., 332
N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. App. 1981);
Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 147 Vt. 268, 514 A.2d 716 (1986); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (en banc); Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342
S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154,368 N.W.2d 666 (1985);
Mobil Coal Producing v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
The state of New York has split decisions on the issue of handbooks as contracts.
Compare Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 466, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982) (holding that a handbook can be a contract) with Rizzo v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 237, 109 A.D.2d 639,641-42,486 N.Y.S.2d 220,
221 (1985) (holding that a handbook is not a contract where the employee is unaware
of its
existence).
77
See Note, supra note 25, at 350-51.
78 See Note, supra note 8, at 1826.
79 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980) (noting that by creating an atmosphere in which an employee believes
handbook policies and practices are official the employer has created a situation in
which the employer should be bound); Comment, supra note 58, at 342 (noting that
courts have turned to the intent of the parties to avoid the unfair results produced by
a mechanical application of the rule).
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courts refuse to accept the employment-at-will doctrine as substantive law which must be followed. Rather, they argue against the
formalistic examination of the contract to determine if employment
is at-will.8 0 Hinging an entire decision in a wrongful discharge
action solely on the fact that the employee was hired for an
indefinite term, these courts assert, can lead to inequitable
81
results.
Many courts that find statements in employment manuals
binding do so by utilizing unilateral contract analysis.8 2 A unilateral contract does not exhibit any bargaining process or exchange
of promises by the parties. In a unilateral contract, only one party
makes a promise (an offer) which invites performance by another. As
such, performance constitutes acceptance of the offer and makes
the promise binding. 83 Authorities note that in unilateral contract
analysis there is only one promisor and that performance constitutes
consideration. 84 It is important to note too that this single perfor85
mance may furnish consideration for multiple promises.
Although unilateral contract theory may be inappropriate for
analyzing complex, multi-party transactions, it has been widely
86
deemed appropriate for employment and handbook scenarios.
Handbooks, like oral assurances, can reasonably be viewed as
specific offers by the employer.8 7 Such handbooks appear as
80 Courts note Professor Wood's lack of support for his rule, and view the American
Rule as nothing more than a rebuttable presumption. See supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text; cases cited supra note 52; see also Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 546, 688 P.2d 170, 172 (1984) (en banc) (stating that
employment-at-will is merely a rule of construction); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 295, 491 A.2d 1257, 1263 (stating that the American Rule is only one
of construction), modified on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Weiner v.
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 453, 466, 443 N.E.2d 441, 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198
(1982) (holding that the at-will rule in New York is a rebuttable presumption).
81See Comment, supra note 58, at 342.
82 See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983); Helle
v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 10-12; 472 N.E.2d 765, 775-76 (1984); Small v.
Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 484, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987).
83 See Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 11, 472 N.E.2d at 775; Smal, 292 S.C. at 484, 357
S.E.2d at 454; A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS ONE VOLUME EDITION § 21, at 31-36,
§ 63, at 102-03 (1952).
84 See Small 292 S.C. at 484-85, 357 S.E.2d at 454; A. CORBIN, supra note 83, § 21
at 54; see alsoJ. CALAMARI &J. PEItLLo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-10 (3d ed. 1987).

8 See Hel; 15 Ohio App. 3d at 11, 472 N.E.2d at 775; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 80 comment a (1979).
86 See cases cited supra note 82.
87 See, e.g., Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 9, 472 N.E.2d 765, 774
(1984) (holding that a severance plan in manual, coupled with oral assurances, could be
viewed as an offer); Small v. Spring Ind., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 484, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454
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official statements by the employer and are promulgated for her
benefit.8 8
Many courts have vigorously rejected management
contentions that handbooks are mere gratuities, since such an
89
interpretation makes handbook promises illusory:
[There are] "strong equitable and social policy reasons militating
against allowing employers to promulgate for their employees
potentially misleading personnel manuals while reserving the right
to deviate from them at their own caprice." ... It is patently
unjust to allow an employer to couch a handbook, bulletin, or
other similar material in mandatory terms and then allow him to
ignore these very policies as "a gratuitous, non-binding statement
of general policy" whenever it works to his disadvantage.
Assuredly, the employer would view these policies differently if it
were the employee who failed to follow them ....

If company

policies are not worth the paper on which they are printed, then
it would be better not to mislead employees by distributing
90
them.
With the employment handbook standing as an offer, employees' commencement or continuation of work supplies the
necessary acceptance and consideration to make a binding unilateral
contract. 91 Whether or not an employee would have continued to
92
work, if a handbook had not been disseminated, is irrelevant.
The only issue under unilateral contract analysis is whether the

(1987) (holding that a handbook was an "offer or promise to hire ... in return for
specified benefits and wages").
88 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d
880, 895 (1980) (stating that guidelines were published and distributed "with a view to
obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved
quality of the work force"). Seegenerally Coombe, Employee Handbooks: Asset orLiability?
12 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 4, 10-13 (1983) (exploring five facets of the employee handbook
as an effective management tool: as image builder; communications opportunity;
vehicle for establishing rules; problem-solving device; and symbol of security).
89 See e.g., Toussain4 408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895 (stating that "[h]aving
announced the policy... the employer may not treat its promise as illusory").
90 Smal4 292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454-55 (citations omitted) (quoting Walker
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 259, 335 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1985)).
91
See Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983); Yartzoff
v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 657, 576 P.2d 356, 359 (1978); A.
CORBN, supra note 83, § 63, at 102-03; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
supra note 85, § 50 comment b (stating that if an offer invites acceptance by
performance,
performance creates a contract).
92
See DeGiuseppe, supra note 18, at 52 & n.282; cf. Anthony v.Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 51 N.J. Super 139, 143 A.2d 762 (1958) (holding that it is immaterial to
the employer's liability whether the employee would have continued in employment in
the absence of an offer of severence pay made by the employer).
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promisee executes some minimal level of performance sufficient to
furnish consideration. 93
Any more stringent
"extra" consideration is superfluous.

requirement

of

In their application of unilateral contract theory, progressive
courts generally have rejected traditional notions of additional
consideration and mutuality of obligation. 94 By the very nature of
a unilateral contract, the consideration for a promise is the actual
act or forbearance sought to be induced. An employee beginning
or continuing her work furnishes just such consideration. 95 This
96
analysis is certainly within the "mainstream of contract doctrine,"
for a detriment (such as work) is sufficient as consideration if
bargaining exists. Moreover, "bargaining" means not only negotiations over the exchange of a promise for consideration, but can also
mean merely that the promise was made with the intention of
inducing the detriment. 97
Courts have consistently noted that
98
for the benefit of the employer.
distributed
are
handbooks
Handbooks are sources of information which often indicate to the
employee that herjob is secure so long as she performs competently. By issuing such handbooks, the employer thus induces a more
orderly, congenial, and loyal work force. 99 Additionally, employment handbooks often are issued to induce employees to reject
unionization. 100 Clearly then, employment manuals are not mere
gratuities. Instead, they can be reasonably interpreted as offers,
promulgated for the employer's advantage, which seek to induce a
detriment on the part of employees. Since an employee's work can

93 See, e.g., Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 777
(1984) ("Consequently, when the promisee's performance is executed, enforceable
obligations arise without more. Under this analysis, then, appellants continued
employment... rendered the contract to pay severance benefits enforceable, regardless
of 'mutuality' or a lack thereof.").
94 See Note, supra note 25, at 357 n.99.
95
See, e.g., Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627 ("The employee's retention of
employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing
to stay on the job, although free to leave, the employee supplies the necessary
consideration for the offer.").
9 H. PERRIT, supra note 4, at 138.
97 See id.
98 See sources cited supra note 88.
99 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980) (stating that an employer's announcement of established personnel
guidelines "secures an orderly, cooperative, and loyal workforce," and provides "the
employee the peace of mind associated withjob security and the conviction that he will
be treated fairly"); see also Coombe, supra note 88, at 10-13.
100 See H. PERRrIr, supra note 4, at 305-06; Note, Employee Handbooks-Mere
Management Guidelines or Enforceabe Contracts? 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 459, 476 (1987).
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supply the necessary detriment, employment handbooks can
logically be viewed as implied contracts.
Unilateral contract analysis also disposes with the traditional
obstacle of mutuality. Whereas valid bilateral contracts require each
party to be bound by a promise, unilateral contracts do not. Simply
put, unilateral contracts are a class of contract exempt from the
mutuality of obligation requirement. I0 I The failure to recognize
this fact has been a source of confusion to many lawyers 0 2 and
may account for the at-will doctrine's continued viability in some
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, in progressive courtrooms the mutuality
of obligation requirement is summarily dismissed as inapplicable to
unilateral contracts.1 0 3 Some progressive courts provide further
analysis by asserting that a demand for mutuality of obligation is
really nothing more than an inquiry into the adequacy of consideration, an inquiry frowned upon by contract law.10 4 As one court
noted, mutuality requirements for a unilateral contract necessitate
only a quid pro quo. 0 5 Thus interpreted, a unilateral contract
0 6
lacks mutuality only when there is an absence of consideration.1
101 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERiLLO, supra note 84, § 2-10, at 69-71; A. CORBIN, supra
note 83, § 152, at 221-23; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 comment f
(1979). Some commentators assert that courts still require mutuality but consider the
requirement fulfilled by continued employment. See Comment, supranote 58, at 356;
Note, supra note 25, at 357 n.99.
102See Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 463-64, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444,
457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (1982); A. CORBIN, supra note 83, § 21, at 31-32.
103 See e.g., Toussain 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885 ("The enforceability of
a contract depends... on consideration and not on mutuality of obligation."); Weine);
57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196 (dismissing mutuality as
unessential to determining the validity of a contract and focusing, instead, on the
presence of consideration); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 484, 357 S.E.2d
452, 454 (1987) (rejecting appellant's contention that lack of mutuality precluded the
existence of an employment contract).
104 See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983)
("The demand for mutuality of obligation ... is simply a species of the forbidden
inquiry into the adequacy of consideration, an inquiry in which this court has, by and
large, refused to engage."); Blades, supra note 20, at 1419-20 (noting that "mutuality is
simply, as many courts have come to recognize, an imperfect way of referring to ...
lack of consideration"). Courts have recognized that the detriment to the promisee
need not be proportionate to the promise made. They have also recognized that a
single and undivided consideration can support any number of promises made by the
employer. See Pugh v. See's Candies Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 924-25 (1981) (quoting Corbin); Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 197; see also A. CORBIN, supra note 83, § 125, at 183; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80 comment a (1979).
15
o See Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984);
see also Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. App. 1976).
106 See Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 12,472 N.E.2d at 776; Langdon, 569 P.2d at 526-27.
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So long as the employer has induced a detriment from the employee
(i.e., work), the employer's promise or promises can be binding.
B. .PromissoryEstoppel
Whereas unilateral contract analysis views the employment
handbook as an implied contract if the requirements of offer,
acceptance, and consideration are met, some courts have made
employers' handbooks binding through the use of promissory
estoppel.' 0 7 Whether these courts shrink from unilateral contract
analysis10 8 or simply prefer a promissory estoppel approach, 0 9
the notion here is that promissory representations reasonably relied
upon by the employee estop the employer from reneging on those
representations. 10 This approach eliminates any need to search
for offer, acceptance, and consideration. Promissory estoppel does
not require bargaining and consideration; instead it seeks to uphold
an employee's reasonable reliance upon handbook statements made
by the employer."' As with the progressive courts and their utilization of unilateral contract theory, courts applying promissory
112
estoppel are motivated by a desire to avoid inequitable results.
Especially when employees can invest years in a job (accumulating
seniority and experience not likely to be transferable to new
employment) 113 or reject alternative job offers, 1 14 non-enforce-

107 See, e.g., Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.
1984) (relying on estoppel to ensure employer adherence to handbook guidelines); King
v. Hosp. Care Corp., No. 1-85-1 (Ohio App. May 13, 1986) (WESTLAW, Ohio Courts
Database) (holding that the lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of
promissory estoppel);Jones v. East Center For Community Mental Health, Inc., 19 Ohio
App. 3d 19, 482 N.E.2d 969 (1984) (enforcing representations contained in handbook
through estoppel); cf. Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark.
1982) (applying estoppel to an oral employment contract).
108
SeeJones, 19 Ohio App. 3d at 22 n.2, 482 N.E.2d at 973 n.2.
109 See, e.g., Defrank v. County of Greene, 50 Pa. Commw. 30,35,412 A.2d 663, 66667 (1980) (finding estoppel analysis applicable to a claim that the employee's discharge
violated the provisions of an employee handbook).
110 See Note, supra note 100, at 461-62.
1 See Note, supra note 25, at 371.
112 See, e.g., Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 361
(N.D. 1984) ("To reject an estoppel here would amount to placing our imprimatur upon
an inequitable manipulation of employees' legitimate expectations .... " (quoting
DeFrank,50 Pa. Commw. at 37, 412 A.2d at 667));Jones v. East Center For Community
Mental Health, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 19, 24, 482 N.E.2d 969, 974 (1984) (stating that
promissory estoppel "is used to wvoid injustice").
11 See Blades, supra note 20, z.t 1405.
114Cf Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (awarding
plaintiff damages on promissory estoppel notion after he was induced to quit his job by
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ment of handbook statements seems especially harsh and detrimen11 5
tal to a healthy employment environment.
The Restatement (Second) of Contractsdefines promissory estoppel

broadly: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of a promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."1 1 6 The definition thus has four requirements. There must,
first, be a promise. Second, the promise must be one the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance. As one
court has noted in the handbook context, the employer's representation is judged by what the "promisor should reasonably expect"
the employee to believe the promise means if the expected action or
forbearance occurs.1 1 7 Third, the promisee must actually act or
forebear to his detriment. Finally, the promise should be enforced
only if injustice otherwise would result.
The principal difference between consideration and promissory
reliance is merely that the former is interpreted to be a bargained8
for contractual prerequisite while the latter is unbargained-for."
By resorting to promissory estoppel, judges who do not feel
employment manuals represent any sort of bargained-for exchange
or who are uncomfortable with finding unilateral contracts may still
avoid unjust results.11 9 While the use of promissory estoppel as
a substitute for consideration is well recognized, 120 it should be
noted that differences still inhere between unilateral contract
analysis and promissory estoppel in their application to employment
handbook cases. A primary difference rests in proof. Under
an offer of work which was subsequently retracted).
115 Trust and job satisfaction in the work place have been deemed exceedingly
important not only for their intrinsic value but also for their positive impact on
productivity. See Bahrami, supra note 36, at 168-71; Farber & Matheson, supranote 46,
at 925-29; Note, supra note 36, at 451-55.
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, 1 1 (1979).
117
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 105, 483 N.E.2d 150, 154-55
(1984).
11
8See Note, supranote 36, at 459 (noting that under a promissory estoppel analysis,
"unbargained-for reliance frequently is regarded as the equivalent of consideration").
119 SeeJones v. East Center for Community Mental Health, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d

19, 24, 482 N.E.2d 969, 973-74 (1984) (rejecting appellant's contention that her
personnel manual constituted a contract, but holding that the facts of appellant's case
did constitute a basis for-promissory estoppel).
120 See Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 492 (W.D. Ark.
1982); Morgan, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel in Australia,
Great Britainand the United States, 15 MELB. U.L. REV. 134, 148 (1985).
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constitutes

consideration. In fact, some courts have presumed that work is
consideration for handbook promises even when the employee did
not know that the handbook existed. 12 1 Under promissory estop122
pel, however, detrimental reliance can be difficult to prove.
Still another difference between unilateral contract theory and
promissory estoppel lies i:n damages. Under a contract approach,
an employee wrongfully discharged in contravention of an employment handbook may recover any damages resulting from the
dismissal. Damages under promissory estoppel are limited as justice
requires.
Moreover, promissory estoppel theoretically limits
damages to reliance damages, 123 although some scholars have
suggested that expectation damages are regularly included in
1 24
liability assessments.
V. UNILATERAL ALTERATIONS TO EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
Concerns of fairness and an increasing willingness to examine
the employment relationship with approaches "more adopted [sic]
to the realities of the wo:rkplace" 125 have prompted the majority
of states to recognize a handbook exception to the employment-atwill doctrine. 126 This exception is part of a larger and continuing
erosion of the American Rule that increasingly takes into account
the rights of employees and the public. 127 Despite this move-

121 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (holding that even where the employee does not know the
particulars of the employer's policies, employer statements of policy can give rise to
contractual rights in employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that
the policy statements would create such rights); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,
99 N.J. 284, 304, 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 (1985), modyfied on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10, 499
A.2d 515 (1985) (adopting the analysis of Anthony v.Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (1958), that, even without evidence of reliance on an
employer's promise, an employee's continued services constituted consideration).
122 See Farber & Matheson, sulra note 46, at 935.
123 See Morgan, supra note 120, at 147; Note, supra note 41, at 171.
124 See Farber & Matheson, supra note 46, at 909.
125 See Comment, supra note 75, at 723.
126 See cases cited supra note 76.
127 See, e.g., Blades, supra note 20, at 1412 (discussing state statutes criminalizing an
employer's coercion of employees in connection with political activities and the
purchase of goods from particular concerns); Note, supra note 27, at 199 (noting an
increasing willingness among states to grant exceptions to the at-will doctrine); Note,
supra note 25, at 342-43 (discussing the limitation on the employment-at-will doctrine
as found in the Railway Labor Act of 1926, the National Labor Relations Act, and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act); supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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ment's modifications in the context of the handbook exception, one
consistent and potentially troublesome caveat accompanies nearly
all the decisions made in this area-even the decisions of progressive
courts applying unilateral contract theory or promissory estoppel.
This troubling caveat is the concession made by courts that,
although an employer's handbook can be found to create binding
promises, an employer may subsequently unilaterally change that
handbook so as to discontinue her duties under it.128 For reasons
of both contract law and equity, this Comment argues that such
unilateral emendations should not be permitted.
Handbooks contain promises covering topics ranging from justcause provisions and procedures for dismissal, to seniority, lay-offs,
and vacation benefits. As explained above, 129 these handbook
promises can be legally enforceable. The handbook, in this sense,
becomes a "Bill of Rights" for employees. Employers, however,
often re-issue newer editions of handbooks that excise previous
statements and procedures. Frequently, disclaimers are added,
describing the handbook as a mere guideline, capable of being
changed at any time. 130 By stating that the handbook does not in
any way constitute the terms of an employment contract 3 1 these
disclaimers attempt to provide the manuals with blanket insulation
from liability.' 3 2 While the courts do show a willingness to
128 Progressive courts, while often carving out an exception to the at-will rule by
finding implied contracts through handbooks, have, in dicta, also sanctioned employer's
unilateral changes to the handbooks. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (stating that, while handbooks may
constitute unilateral contracts, employers retain the ability to modify these handbooks
unilaterally); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983)
(noting that statements of policy can be unilaterally amended by the employer without
notice to the employee).
129See supra notes 78-124 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988)
(holding that, where the employer added a disclaimer to a handbook 14 years after
plaintiff was hired, the employee could not rely on the handbook to demonstrate that
the employment was not at-will).
131 see id
132 The effect of disclaimers in original or amended handbooks is unpredictable,

varying with jurisdiction and the facts of each case. See Note, The Use of Disclaimes to
Avoid Employer Liability UnderEmployee Handbook Provisions,12 J. CORP. L. 105, 112-15
(1986). The author of that note suggests that "[r]ather than searching for the 'perfect'
disclaimer," management should instead concentrate on issuing carefully conceived
handbooks by which it is willing to abide. See id. at 120; see also Jones v. Central
Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783,788 (Alaska 1989) (rejecting a handbook disclaimer
because 85 pages of the handbook created an impression contrary to the one sentence
disclaimer).
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protect employees' accrued rights (such as seniority, severance pay,
and, in some aspects, vacation) from subsequent unilateral changes,1 33 the potential for an employer to retract promises or to
distribute a new handbook which is inconsistent with a former
edition is disturbing.
A. The Argument for Allowing UnilateralChanges
by Employers
The primary reason why many courts seem willing to allow
unilateral changes to handbooks is that such changes appear to be
countenanced by unilateral contract analysis itself. If an employer's
handbook is specific enough to constitute an offer and if an
employee's commencement or continuation of work constitutes
acceptance and consideration, 13 4 logically, by continuing to work
after the issuance of an amended handbook, the employee has once
1 35
again bound herself and the employer to the new handbook.
As one court concisely summed, "[i]f [the employer] chooses to
modify its existing policies, a new unilateral contract is offered, and
36
an employee can signify acceptance by remaining on the job."1
Another, non-contractual reason for permitting unilateral
changes, advanced by at least one court, is that such changes injure
the employer just as they injure the employee. 137 Since the
133 See, e.g., Gilman v. County of Cheshire, 493 A.2d 485, 489 (N.H. 1985) (holding

that while employers may modify terms of employment, rights whicl have vested under
previous terms of employment are not subject to modification); Helle v. Landmark, Inc.,
15 Ohio App. 3d 1,472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (1984) (holding that, where oral assurances of
severance pay conflicted with the employment manual's disclaimers or induced
employees to disregard their significance, the assurances negate the disclaimers thereby

absolving the employer from liability for unilateral alterations in the written manual);
Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that where an
at-will employee performs in reliance on the employer's articulated personnel policies,
the employer may modify those policies, but remains bound to them insofar as they
have accrued to an employee for performance rendered).
134 See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
135 See, e.g., Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131-32 (D. Ariz.
1988) (stating that the employer's inclusion of a disclaimer in a handbook published
subsequent to plaintiff's employment constituted an offer to modify a unilateral contract
ofemployment, which the plaintiff accepted by continuingher employment); Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (stating that employment
contracts may be modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract, with the
employee's continued employment signifying acceptance); Brookshaw v. South St. Paul
Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that if an employer
modifies existing policies, a new unilateral contract is offered which the employee
accepts
by remaining on the job).
1
16 Brookshaw, 381 N.W.2d at 36.
137 See Bankeyv. Storer Broadcasting Co., 432 Mich. 438,454,443 N.W.2d 112, 119
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employer distributes the original handbook seeking to secure good
will and increased productivity, any subsequent denial of employee
privileges and rights diminishes the employer's benefit.1 38 Because the employer is also injured, there is thus a strong disincentive for employers to alter their handbooks in ways adverse to their
employees; theoretically, employers would only change their
manuals when absolutely necessary.
Closely linked to this notion of mutual injury is the suggestion
that an employer, as the manager of the business venture, should
retain the flexibility and latitude necessary to operate the business
as she sees fit; indeed this idea underlies much of the argument in
favor of unilateral modification.1 39 Company policies, including
those in an employment handbook, are not static. To hold that
handbooks contain immutable rights would mean that policies
"could never be changed short of successful renegotiation with each
employee who worked while the policy was in effect." 140 Holdouts and logistical problems could thus result in a patchwork of
employment arrangements across a work force. This argument
suggests that uniformity of contract would disappear and the
employer would find herself obligated in a variety of ways to
different groups of employees depending upon the handbook they
were hired under and what modifications they had accepted. 4 '
While most courts that uphold unilateral changes to employment manuals do require that adequate notice be given to all
affected employees, 142 principles of contract law and reasons of
policy suggest to many courts that unilateral changes in subsequent
manuals-even when inconsistent with policies established in the
former handbook-are legitimately enforceable.
B. The Argument Against Allowing Unilateral
Changes by Employers
While only a handful of jurisdictions have considered the issue
of unilateral modifications to employment manuals, an even smaller
number of courts have suggested that such alterations are not
(1989).
138

id.

1s90 See id. at 456, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
14

Im

See id.
142 See id. at 457, 443 N.W.2d at 120. But see Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,

141

408 Mich. 579, 615, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980).
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automatically binding. 43 Nevertheless, the arguments that can be
advanced for this latter position are compelling.
As a matter ofjurisprudence, many of the decisions upholding
unilateral modification cite with approval "precedent" which does
not even involve the issue of alterations to handbooks. 44 While
many of the seminal cases; concerning the issue of whether handbooks could ever be implied contracts did incidentally claim that
employers could subsequently modify such manuals, these statements were made with little to no analysis since they were not
essential to the holding of the case sub judice.145 Such dicta
should not provide authority for the cases permitting modification.
More substantively, decisions permitting unilateral modification
are "inconsistent with general contract law" 1 46 and in fact "run
contrary to established principles of contract formation." 47 This
is primarily because the employer is legally bound by the terms of
the promises made in the prior handbook; 1 48 she cannot thereaf1 49
ter unilaterally amend the conditions of that implied contract.
As Professor Corbin asserts, "the employer's offered promise
becomes irrevocable by [the employer] as soon as the employee has
rendered any substantial service in the process of accepting; and
this is true in spite of the fact that the employee may be privileged
15 0
to quit the service at any time."
143See, e.g., Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1255 (D.S.C. 1989) (holding
that an employee's contractual rights are not altered by distribution of new handbooks
unless the employee consented to the modification and received consideration);
Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871, 875 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding
that unilateral amendments to a handbook are not automatically effective upon issuance
of the second handbook); King v. Hospital Care Corp., No. 1-85-1 (Ohio App., May 13,
1986) (WESTLAW, Ohio Courts Database) (holding that an employer could not
unilaterally modify the terms of a handbook-created contract); Helle v. Landmark, Inc.,
15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 11-12, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776-77 (1984) (holding that handbook
alterations are not binding unless the employee consented to modification and received
consideration).
144See, e.g., Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131-32 (D. Ariz.
1988) (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 33 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983));
Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(same).
145See Toussain, 292 N.W.2d at 892; Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 627 (Minn. 1983).
146 Thompson, 653 F. Supp. at 876.
147 Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235.
148 See id.
149See King v. Hospital Care Corp., No. 1-85-1 (Ohio App., May 13, 1986)
(WESTLAW,
Ohio Courts Database).
I5 0 A. CORBIN, supra note 83, § 153, at 224.
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It must be recognized and emphasized that issuing a second,
unilaterally modified handbook is not the same as issuing the first.
The employer who issues a second handbook is not taking the
employee out of an at-will situation by offering her an implied
contract. Instead, the second handbook constitutes an offer to
modify the existing implied contract. While such an offer may be
accepted, an amended handbook does not become effective
automatically upon issuance by the employer and continuation of
work by the employee.1 5 1 Rather, the traditional requirements of
contract modification-assent to modify and additional consideration
(here from the employer)-must be met.1 52 The reason that the
requirement of additional consideration here is dissimilar to the
simple work requirement necessary under the unilateral contract
analysis for the original handbook lies in the differing contexts.
With a first edition handbook, an employee must act to accept the
employer's offer embodied in the manual. However, an employee
need not act to reject a subsequent modified handbook. The
employee already enjoys an enforceable implied contract. Only an
acceptance requires affirmative action in the form of performance.1 53 As one court asserted, "Requiring an offeree to take
affirmative steps to reject an offer ... is inconsistent with general
contract law ....

15 4
The offeree need make no reply to the offer"

and her silence does not imply assent.1 55 Accordingly, it is not
incumbent upon the employee to give specific notice of rejection.
Moreover, the mere fact that an employee continues to work does
not constitute acceptance of the unilaterally altered employment
manual.1 5 6 Whether employees do accept the offered modification of a revised handbook is thus a question of fact for ajury in its
assessment of assent and consideration.1 57 Assumptions by some
courts that continued work by the employee automatically makes the
amended handbook binding are contrary to established principals
of contract law.
151 See Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (E.D. Va.

1987).

152 See Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1235-36 (D.S.C. 1989); Thompson,
653 F. Supp. at 875-76; see also 15 S. WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1829 (3d ed. 1957 & Supp. 1990).
153 See 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 152, § 91.
154 Thompson, 653 F. Supp. at 876.
155 See id.
156 See id.

157 See Toth v. Square D. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D.S.C. 1989).
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It is interesting to note that the above interpretation is entirely
consistent with the "freedom of contract" doctrine which once
buttressed the venerable at-will rule.' 58 Freedom of contract permits all parties to contract: as they see fit. If employers are willing
to agree to employment on particular terms for an unspecified
duration, then the handbook allows them to do so.1 59 Yet once
that contract is made it should be respected. Employers should be
held to their promises. This simple respect for the integrity of the
handbook-created contract will guard against the temptation for
employers to promise at one moment what they could just as easily
take away at the next.1 60 The policy which underlies the original
handbook exception to the at-will doctrine-the protection of
employees from the inequities of illusory promises held out to
them-is thus just as persuasive in the unilateral alteration context.
For if "[i]t is patently unjust to allow an employer to couch a
handbook, bulletin, or other similar material in mandatory terms
and then allow [the employer] to ignore these very policies as 'a
gratuitous non-binding statement of general policy' whenever it
works to [the employer's] disadvantage";161 the same logic must
apply to unilateral changes. Clearly, it would be nearly as easy for
the employer to change her handbook as to "ignore" it. As one
court has noted, "[i]f an employer were permitted to extinguish an
employee's rights under an existing handbook through the simple
expedient of a revised handbook, employees could suffer the very
162
inequities the [handbook exception] court sought to prevent."
Indeed, if the cases which interpret handbooks as contracts stand
for one proposition, it is the notion that employer representations
relating to substantive rights and duties can be binding. Giving
legal force to unilateral changes to handbooks, however, does
serious damage to this notion.
Closely aligned with the principle that the employment handbook has contractual integrity is the proposition that handbooks
should be enforceable by employees who have relied on their
promises. For example, employees who join companies with just
158 See H. PERR1Tr, supra note 4, at 4-5.
159 See Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 7, 472 N.E.2d 765, 772 (1984);
Note, supra note 25, at 368-69.
160 See Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871, 875 (E.D. Va.
1987).
161 Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235 (quoting Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481,
485-86, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454-55 (1987)).
162 Id.
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cause provisions in their handbooks come to rely on such statements. It is grossly unjust to tell an employee who has been
working for years under such a provision that the handbook has
suddenly been changed. Such a change can have great impact on
an employee who previously could be fired only for good cause.
Unfortunately, it cannot be presumed that such a change is an
innocuous one for the competent employee. In fact, case histories
indicate that satisfactory employees of long service are often fired
soon after such alterations to employee handbooks.1 63 The
fairness which employees who have relied on employment manual
statements deserve-in essence the principle of promissory estoppel-further enhances the desirability of respecting the original
handbook agreement.
Courts that have been quick to deny any contractual obstacles
to allowing a revised employment manual to replace a former
edition have been given cause to hesitate over promissory estoppel
concerns. 164 In fact, while one state supreme court held that
employers may unilaterally change their written policies concerning
just cause provisions in their handbooks, it also included an opinion
which warned that if "the court determines that legitimate expectations of job security arose before the change in policy from
discharge-for-cause to termination-at-will, the court should provide
a remedy." 16 5 It seems clear that any court willing to use promissory estoppel to give force to employer promises in the context of
an original handbook should also be willing, de facto, to apply the
doctrine to estop an amended handbook.
Other arguments supporting the unilateral amendment of
employment manuals seem insubstantial or speculative. The
concern for uniformity of contracts across a work force appears
insignificant compared to the contractual or equitable rights
employees retain under unilateral contract or promissory estoppel
analyses. Furthermore, such a concern may be more hypothetical
than real. Corporations frequently employ unionized and non6

See, e.g., Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988)
(noting that an employee with fourteen years of service was fired soon after ajust cause
handbook was disclaimed); King v. Hosp. Care Corp., No. 1-85-1 (Ohio App. May 13,
1986) (WESTLAW, Ohio Courts Database) (noting that an employer added a disclaimer
to a handbook with just cause provisions and soon thereafter fired an eighteen-yearemployee).
I' See Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 432 Mich. 438, 459-61, 443 N.W.2d 112,
121-22 (1989) (Levin, J., separate opinion).
13

165 Id.
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unionized, as well as contract and at-will employees.' 6 6 Moreover,
employers will have little difficulty amending handbooks to the
advantage of employees. The assent and consideration necessary to
give effect to beneficial modifications to the former handbook
should pose no problem. Only when the employer is attempting to
alter the handbook to the detriment of the employee will she
encounter resistance.
Far from spawning a multitude of handbook contracts, a respect
(judicially enforced or otherwise) for the terms embodied in the
original handbook may create uniformity. Variations in handbook
terms across a work force can create dissension and reduce
productivity. Additionally, potential employees may be reluctant to
join a firm if employees working under former handbooks enjoy
better benefits. Because of such potential disparity and the ease
with which employers could improve handbook packages, ajudicial
presumption against unilateral modification of employment manuals
would retard unfair amendments and tend to enhance the incentive
for employers to offer one attractive employment manual to both
present and future employees.
Concerns for managerial flexibility seem equally ill-founded.
This Comment argues against any rationale that suggests unilateral
modifications to handbooks are automatically binding on employees
who continue to work. This is not to state that minor changes could
never be made to a handbook or that major amendments could
never be offered and accepted. Respect for the employee handbook
as a contract simply implies duties akin to those arising from a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.16 7 Such a restriction
would merely prevent the employer from making substantive
changes counter to the spirit of the handbook contract unless she
provides consideration and the employee assents. Absent exigent
business circumstances, 168 interests in protecting the integrity of
166
167

See R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do? 34 (1984).
See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See generally Madison,
The Employee's EmergingRight to Sue forArbitraqy or UnfairDischarge, 6 EMP. REL. LJ. 422,
426-35 (1980-81) (discussing covenanits of good faith and fair dealingin the employment
context).
168
See Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 74,543 A.2d 954 (1988)
(holding that an action does not lie for wrongful discharge where loss of work was a
result of the elimination of ajob itself due to legitimate economic factors, even where
the eliminated employee enjoyed a "just cause" clause stated in a personnel manual);
see also Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 300-01, 491 A.2d 1257, 1266
& n.8 (1985) (explaining that a contract arising from an employment manual may be
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the original handbook contract and employee interests make it only
fair that the traditional prerequisites of contract modification be
observed.
CONCLUSION

Because handbook modification is not analogous to the issuance
of an original handbook, legal principles pertaining to contractual
formation and the handbook are inapposite. Instead, employer
alteration of handbooks must be assessed against the modification
prerequisites of assent and consideration as outlined here. Assent
and consideration are issues of fact for a jury which must be
explored within the context of each case. Additionally, notions of
reliance and promissory estoppel should be considered as factors
relevant to the unilateral alteration of employment manuals.
The above approach, while admittedly making it more difficult
for management to alter the handbook relationship with its
employees, will not make alteration impossible. Consequently,
managerial flexibility will not ossify. Whatever the speculative and
limiting effects such an approach may have, it seems only appropriate that the employer, having freely written and proffered the
handbook to her employees, should be bound by the terms of the
original document.

terminated when business circumstances so require), modified on othergrounds, 101 N.J.

10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985). Certainly even employees working under handbooks with just
cause provisions maybe terminated under exigent business circumstances. Reductions

in force as well as technological advances may necessitate some firings. However, this
Comment contemplates only business exigencies-not mere expedience-as valid reasons
for the discharge of employees counter to the terms of an employment handbook.

